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Human resource development activities on nuclear security in international society have moved 
gradually from a focus on the military dimension of the problem to the social management of 
conflict and threat. The objective of this article is to describe the human resource development 
(HRD) activities in the area nuclear nonproliferation and security at the International Nuclear 
Nonproliferation and Security Academy (INSA) of the Korea Institute of Nuclear 
Nonproliferation and Control (KINAC). 
 
This paper begins by touching on the relevant conception of nuclear security in the Republic of 
Korea (ROK), which has guided the ROK in its HRD efforts. Next, the international relations 
context that set the stage for the establishment of INSA as a Korean Center of Excellence (COE) 
in connection with the Nuclear Security Summit (NSS) is described. The third section offers a 
detailed explanation of INSA’s mission and main activities. The final section considers lessons 
learned in the first year of INSA’s nuclear nonproliferation and security HRD activities in terms 
of establishing a culture of nuclear security.  
I. Introduction 
During the Cold War, the field of nuclear security was mainly focused on strategies related to 
nuclear weapons and their deployment. The role of nuclear weapons in the confrontation between 
the capitalist and communist blocs of countries, led respectively by the United States and the 
Soviet Union, reinforced a simplified conception of nuclear security based on military aspects. 
However, following the Cold War, a wide range of socio-political and economic changes have 
given rise to a modification to the traditional military-focused concept of nuclear security, 
expanding it to include not only the civil sector but also our daily lives.  
 
In this context, human resources development (HRD) activities regarding nuclear 
nonproliferation and security aim to address the changing needs arising from political and social 
transition and to promote a culture of nuclear security. 
 
This article describes the HRD activities in the area of nuclear nonproliferation and security at the 
International Nuclear Nonproliferation and Security Academy (INSA) of the Korea Institute of 
Nuclear Nonproliferation and Control (KINAC), addressing specifically how the Institute’s HRD 
activities in nuclear nonproliferation and security respond to related social needs and the 
dynamics of international relations.  
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The paper begins by touching on the relevant conception of nuclear security in the Republic of 
Korea (ROK), which has guided the ROK in its HRD efforts. Next, the international relations 
context that set the stage for the establishment of INSA as a Korean Center of Excellence (COE) 
in connection with the Nuclear Security Summit (NSS) is described. The third section offers a 
detailed explanation of INSA’s mission and main activities. The final section considers lessons 
learned in the first year of INSA’s nuclear nonproliferation and security HRD activities in terms 
of establishing a culture of nuclear security.  
II. Korean Conceptions of Nuclear Security and the 
2010 Nuclear Security Summit 
The terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, were a direct challenge to the new military and 
political world order after the end of the Cold War, which was characterized by the unipolar 
dominance of the United States. The possibility of attack against the civilian facilities not 
initiated by any specific government was an important factor that influenced the Nuclear Security 
Summit (NSS) in 2010.  
 
Since the end of the Cold War, rapid economic growth in developing countries, unstable fossil 
fuel price fluctuation and exhaustion of oil and gas resources, and greenhouse gas mitigation 
efforts have caused the international community to seek sustainable energy alternatives such as 
nuclear energy, giving birth to what has been termed a “nuclear renaissance” in which many 
argue for a greater utilization of civilian nuclear power. The 2011 Fukushima nuclear disaster 
hurt this cause with its impacts on the natural environment, and also it raised a series of questions 
regarding international social crisis management capability, energy options in a country and the 
interface of nuclear safety and security. The so-called nuclear renaissance in newcomer countries 
has also raised worries about nuclear proliferation potentiality, which further highlights the need 
for human resources development (HRD) throughout the international community.  
 
In this international context, the Republic of Korea (ROK) contracted with the United Arab 
Emirates (UAE) in December 2009 to supply four APR-1400 commercial reactors. The ROK also 
won a contract in the beginning of 2010 to supply Jordan with a HANARO research reactor. As a 
result, the ROK has emerged as a new supplier in the nuclear power plant industry.  
 
At the first NSS, held in Washington, DC in April 2010, former ROK President Lee Myung-bak 
committed to the establishment of a center of excellence (COE) in the ROK that would provide 
nuclear security education and training to the international community.  
 
As a supplier country in the nuclear power plant industry, the ROK understands its responsibility 
to strengthen the international nuclear security regime. This policy orientation represents the main 
factor in the establishment of INSA. 
 
Following the 2001 attacks on the World Trade Center and the Fukushima accident, the 
international community has become nervous about nuclear technology and reluctant to pursue its 
peaceful uses for energy. Instead, collective international efforts have been further driven to 
strengthen a networking toward chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear (CBRN) risk 
mitigation. In an effort to strengthen the HRD activities with the networks of expertise required 
for this risk mitigation, the ROK, China and Japan jointly declared at the 2010 NSS that they 
would establish their own centers of excellence for nuclear security and open them to the 
international community.  
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 Japan opened its COE, the Integrated Support Center for Nuclear Nonproliferation and Nuclear 
Security (ISCN), in 2011. INSA of the ROK opened in Feb. 2014, just before the third NSS in 
Hague. China’s COE, called the State Nuclear Security Technology Center (SNSTC), is still 
under construction in the vicinity of Beijing, and is scheduled to be opened in late 2015 or early 
2016. Since February 2013, the three countries, each represented by their own COE personnel, 
have met together regularly in Vienna under the leadership of the International Atomic Energy 
Agency (IAEA) to discuss the exchange of education and training program/courses and related 
information. 
 
The ROK conception of nuclear security has two faces. The first reflects a general concern about 
threats from both state and non-state actors. Following global trends, the ROK values strong 
preparedness against terrorism. Due to the continuation of the geopolitical status quo of the Cold 
War as represented by North Korea, traditional military concerns also remain strong, as North 
Korea has further isolated itself from the international community with nuclear brinkmanship and 
other provocations, including the testing of nuclear weapons in 2006, 2009 and 2013. But the 
other face of nuclear security in the ROK is a comprehensive and integrated approach, which 
requires a change of awareness and practical responses from the nuclear facility operators, 
generally working very near to civilian life-space, in connection with safeguards, safety and 
security. 
III. INSA’s Mission, Operational Direction, and Main 
Activities 
An effective nuclear security system requires the provision of capabilities to prevent, detect and 
respond to a criminal or an unauthorized act with nuclear security implications, involving nuclear 
and other material. In order to remain effective, such a system also requires systematic 
development sustained by the state and by competent authorities [1]. This goal can be achieved 
by the establishment of a COE with a mandate that includes the spreading of awareness and 
understanding of nuclear security for persons indirectly related to the nuclear security system. 
These aims of a single state–focused nuclear security COE could be equally applied to a regional 
and international scope. Thus, local or national nuclear security systems can be considered as a 
part of international nuclear nonproliferation systems. The establishment of an effective and 
sustainable nuclear nonproliferation system in a state in connection with peaceful uses of nuclear 
energy requires an integrated approach that includes three aspects: nuclear security, safeguards, 
and export/import controls. Even though the aspect of nuclear safety has been decisively 
important for the efficient, peaceful and sustainable uses of nuclear energy, we don’t deal with 
the safety aspect in this paper.  
 
To accomplish its mission of preventing the proliferation of nuclear weapons, a COE might 
develop and mobilize a network of nuclear nonproliferation experts. Such a network can facilitate 
the exchange of information and experience among its members and provide access to relevant 
scientific and technical knowledge and tools to state nuclear nonproliferation authorities. It might 
be said, then, that the essential activities of a COE are its education and training for human 
resource development. The effectiveness of this core function is bolstered by the support of 
sustainable technical and scientific research and development.  
 
A national nuclear nonproliferation training program should be based on a process such as the 
systematic approach to training (SAT), which has five key elements: analysis, design, 
development, implementation, and evaluation (ADDIE) [2]. These five elements constitute a 
cyclical process, beginning with an analysis that is based on the tailored training needs of all the 
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 related nuclear facilities and activities in a state or in targeted regional and international countries 
[1]. 
 
The operational direction of INSA is driven by practical approaches and an emphasis on 
substantiality and applicability, where trainees can actively participate and learn through hands-on 
experiences. This involves an outdoor test field and IT-based training. INSA intends to help 
nuclear newcomer countries establish their national integrated nuclear nonproliferation and 
security systems, and implement them effectively and efficiently for their eventual peaceful uses 
of nuclear energy.  
 
In 2010, KINAC/INSA began its preparative activities with an analysis of the educational and 
training needs, weak points, and capacity gaps at the national, regional and international levels. 
Based on this initial analysis, it completed the dimension of design in 2011 regarding the scale 
and composition of training facilities, HRD activities, and the necessary actions for developing 
trainers, programs, and detailed courses and modules, including mid- and long-term budgets. This 
design phase was immediately followed by the development during 2012-13 of all facilities, 
equipment, programs with courses and every module.  After its official inauguration ceremony on 
February 19, 2014, INSA entered the phase of implementation, holding its first international 
nuclear security-training course from March 10-14, 2014, inviting about 30 international trainees 
from 12 foreign countries. The second international training course on safeguards was held the 
week of June 9, 2014, while the international course on nuclear export/import control was held 
the week of November 10, 2014.  
 
Through 2016, INSA will be in the evaluation phase of its activities, setting objectives and 
instituting a reliable assessment mechanism. For the preparation of the assessment system, INSA 
has contracted a group of consultants in the ROK to perform a special research project on how to 
promote quality education and training, and how to establish an effective evaluation system for 
education and training. Based on this preliminary research, carried out during 2014, the main 
research and development project will be completed during 2015-16.  
 
There are three different categories of education and training at KINAC/INSA: a legally binding 
education/training course for domestic nuclear facility personnel and national safeguards and 
security inspectors; international education and training; and non-legally binding training for 
other domestic organs, including the public. 
 
Regarding the first category of education and training, the Korean government has entrusted 
KINAC by law to provide education and training on nuclear nonproliferation and nuclear security 
for personnel working in facilities related to peaceful uses of nuclear energy. These personnel 
include those who carry out activities of nuclear material accounting and control on special 
nuclear materials, research-project managers who carry out nuclear fuel cycle–related projects 
and R&D, and nuclear facility operators and staff who work in nuclear security and physical 
protection–related areas. 
 
International education and training courses are directly related to the raison d’être of 
KINAC/INSA. These courses are organized around nuclear security, safeguards, and 
export/import control. There are also international programs for the Regional Training Course 
(RTC) program of the IAEA for the Asia and Middle East regional personnel on nuclear security 
and safeguards as well as an IAEA inspector-training course in close association with IAEA. 
 
The purpose of the first KINAC/INSA initiated course, held on March 10-14, 2014 in Daejeon, 
was to raise participant awareness about the need for a nuclear security system that reduces the 
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 threat of nuclear terrorism. This course also covered a methodology for the prevention of 
radiological sabotage and theft of nuclear materials, based on the IAEA booklet on Physical 
Protection of Nuclear Material and Nuclear Facilities (INFCIRC/225/Rev. 5). The course 
consisted of lectures and subgroup exercises, which utilized INSA’s security training and test 
(SETT) facilities located at INSA, and evaluation software.  
 
The course began with an introduction of the global nuclear security framework and IAEA 
guidance, followed by an overview of physical protection concepts. A three-step methodology for 
design and analysis of a physical protection system was also covered. This included the following 
aspects: (1) definition of physical protection system requirements, (2) design of a physical 
protection system, and (3) evaluation of a physical protection system design. Then, subgroup 
sessions provided the participants with the opportunity to apply the lecture material to practical 
situations. Exercises included not only field exercises at the SETT facility but also an evaluation 
of a physical protection system using 3D software. Finally, the development of a national nuclear 
security system was discussed in the context of the Korean experience. 
 
The second KINAC/INSA course on nuclear safeguards, held from June 9-13, 2014, covered state 
systems for accounting for and control of nuclear material (SSAC). The course consisted of 
lectures, exercises, and a facility visit. As with the first course on international nuclear security, 
exercises provided the participants with the opportunity to apply the lecture material to practical 
situations. The main topics of the course were as follows: 
1) The international nuclear nonproliferation regime 
2) The IAEA safeguards system under its Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement 
3) Provision of nuclear material accounting reports and design information to the IAEA 
4) Establishment of a state system of accounting for and control of nuclear material 
5) Additional protocol and integrated safeguards  
 
Finally, the participants visited the Hanbit nuclear power plant (Type OPR-1,000), which is 
located 87 miles southwest from INSA.  
 
The third KINAC/INSA course, on strategic trade control, held from November 10-14, 2014, was 
designed to introduce participants at the beginner level to strategic trade controls that satisfy and 
implement international norms. The course consisted of lectures and a visit to operating nuclear 
facility. The main topics of the course included the following: 
1) WMD proliferation risk and awareness 
2) The multilateral nonproliferation regime 
3) Trigger list items and dual-use items 
4) The experience of the ROK and the US on strategic trade controls.  
 
Participants visited the Doosan Heavy Industry Co., which is located at 109 miles south of INSA. 
 
Regarding domestic education and training which is not legally mandated, KINAC is expanding 
its education and training service vis-à-vis indirectly related facilities and organs involved with 
the strengthening of a nuclear nonproliferation and security culture, including members of the 
public. Prior to the opening of INSA, KINAC had been providing education courses to colleges 
and graduate students, particularly to those majoring in nuclear engineering and international 
relations. These activities are aimed at enlarging and deepening a domestic nuclear 
nonproliferation and security culture.  
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 A. INSA Facilities 
In a five-story main building of about 205,000 square feet, INSA built its education and training 
facilities with lecture rooms in a diverse range of sizes. The complex has internal and external 
security training and test (SETT) facilities. The external SETT facilities consist of four sectors, 
providing a comprehensive system for the simulation of detection, delay and response. Sector 1 
houses radiation portal monitoring and the access control system. Sector 2 is dedicated to the 
testing of a conventional physical protection system (PPS). Sector 3 is for the testing of an 
advanced PPS, where the results of research and development performed by KINAC, competent 
institutes and related industries can be tested before practical application and commercialization. 
Sector 4 is for small-scale “force on force” training, including an intrusion-related destructive 
testing system. Internal SETT, located in the main building, allows INSA users to have hands-on 
experience with physical protection equipment and to test internal equipment with tabletop 
exercises. It also exhibits equipment for the exercise of force on force. As an internal SETT, the 
Central Alarm Station (CAS) was built for both R&D and education and training purposes. The 
CAS collects signals and data of the various PPS installed at the external SETT. It is 
comprehensively interfaced with the Video Management System (VMS), the Intrusion Detection 
Management Systems (IDMS) and the 3D convergence solution system. The CAS system, in 
association with VMS, IDMS and the 3D convergence solution system, can be applied as a 
similar testing method for a CAS function, being under operation in actual nuclear facilities. 
 
INSA houses safeguards-related R&D facilities in the main building, which include the Radiation 
Measurement and Equipment Training (RMET) lab and the Clean Room for Estimation and 
Assay of Trace Nuclear Materials (CREAN) lab. The objectives of these facilities are to improve 
existing radiation detection equipment, develop new radiation detection systems, and to provide a 
suitable environment for education and training on radiation detection equipment. 
 
As a training tool, INSA has prepared a Virtual Reality Program (VRP); 3D-based educational 
software applied to safeguards inspection activities in connection with nuclear material 
accountancy in light water reactor power plants. For the purpose of safeguards training, INSA 
provides diverse real equipment and tools. Its at-risk evaluation software of nuclear power plant 
facility PPS, called Integrated Code for Risk Analysis 3D (INCOREA 3D), allows trainees to 
experience a simulated design of a nuclear facility PPS and to evaluate its vulnerability. INSA 
also operates an e-learning system for the benefit of national nuclear R&D institutions and 
nuclear power plant facility personnel, which is a Web-based e-learning system providing courses 
on nuclear security and nuclear nonproliferation, including export controls. 
IV. Effects and Lessons Learned 
KINAC’s ability to establish INSA in a relatively short time after the Korean government 
statement at the first NSS can be attributed to the fact that KINAC had played a regulating role as 
a technical support organization (TSO) in the area of safeguards, physical protection and 
export/import control since 2004 in the ROK. Previous to establishing the COE, KINAC had 
well-established procedures for reviewing documents related to nuclear nonproliferation and 
control in the ROK, and also carried out inspection activities in the field of nuclear safeguards 
and physical protection for Korean authorities. 
 
Despite the fact that only one year has passed since its inauguration, INSA has already seen a 
number of effects in connection with its international education and training efforts. As the first 
COE in a former newcomer country (as opposed to one of the advanced nuclear industry 
countries), INSA has based its activities on the Korean experience as a nuclear power plant 
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 supplier country, with 23 NPPs in operation as of the end of 2014. While an integrated and 
comprehensive approach to nuclear nonproliferation and security focused on nuclear safeguards, 
security and strategic trade controls have previously been performed mainly by the US, the IAEA, 
and other Western entities, INSA represents the operation of an Asian COE in cooperation with 
the US and the IAEA. This has positioned KINAC/INSA to play a facilitating role in the region, 
sharing best practices with its neighbors, particularly China and the Philippines [3].1 In 
September 2014, INSA concluded memoranda of understanding (MOUs) for HRD cooperation 
with the Indonesian regulatory body BAPETEN, and with the Vietnamese regulatory body 
VARANS. In these ways and others, INSA has served as a nexus for these regional countries to 
increase their cooperation and networking for nuclear nonproliferation and nuclear security, based 
on a common regional culture. 
 
KINAC/INSA has also observed a number of lessons learned from the initial phases of its 
establishment. First, the establishment of a COE should be based on a national decision in 
harmony with its long-term policies, in order to assure a necessary budget and sustainable 
resources. Second, a regulatory body could be in a better position than a facility operator for 
establishing a COE. This is because the regulatory body has relatively more experiences and 
competent manpower in the area of nuclear safeguards, security and strategic trade controls in 
conjunction with the reviewing of documents and implementing inspections. Third, the 
application of the ADDIE method can serve as a useful, universal guideline for establishing a 
sustainable COE. Fourth, in the phase of development of a COE in conjunction with the ADDIE 
method, it is vital to have access to the services of a capable lecturer in nuclear nonproliferation 
and nuclear security that also has an excellent command of English. This is one reason why it’s 
very important to have a close network with native English-language experts apart from the 
IAEA, despite the fact that the IAEA can provide a COE with a generalized and universalized 
logic and information for education and training. Fifth, for success in the long term, a COE 
should develop an original approach to education and training. A COE should try to differentiate 
itself from other COEs as it develops its own best practices. One way to achieve this is through 
the frequent application of exercises for each course with a relevant nuclear facility visit program. 
Sixth, a COE should arrange to accommodate a diverse range of cultural and religious 
preferences. 
V. Conclusion 
In addition to its domestic programs and courses, INSA has carried out three self-initiated 
international education and training programs in the areas of nuclear security, safeguards and 
export/import controls in 2014. It has also conducted two coordinated regional training courses 
with the IAEA in the fields of on nuclear security and safeguards. 
 
In 2015, INSA will carry out three intermediate-level programs on nuclear security, safeguards 
and export/import controls, while hosting four IAEA regional training courses on sabotage, 
forensics, and a train-the-trainers (TTT) course on physical protection of nuclear material and 
nuclear facilities, in addition to introductory course of safeguards. INSA has also strengthened its 
                                                     
1
 The ROK, represented by INSA, made an agreement with China, represented by the State Nuclear Support 
Technology Center (SNSTC) on the occasion of the 11th ROK-China Bilateral Nuclear Energy Cooperation Meeting, 
held in Beijing in May 2014 for exchange of information and lecturers. In addition, INSA, invited by the IAEA and 
represented by the Director General, visited the Philippine Nuclear Research Institute (PNRI) to attend the workshop 
entitled, “Review of the Integrated Nuclear Security Support Plan (INSSP)” and organized by the IAEA and PNRI on 
Nov. 27-28, 2014, in Manila, where INSA presented to the PNRI and related Philippine authorities of the Philippine on 
the topic of “The Experiences of the INSA to Establish a COE.” The INSSP is a planning tool of the IAEA to support 
the systematic implementation of nuclear security activities. 
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 domestic education and training endeavors, focusing on highlighting and deepening awareness of 
a culture of nuclear nonproliferation and security. Domestic efforts are gradually moving toward 
the harmonized approach of 3S—Security, Safeguards and Safety—with its relevant 
organizations, even though it can take substantial time for related entities to overcome 
conventional factionalism. 
 
INSA is working closely with the US and the IAEA to assure the quality of its instructors and 
course materials, making use of government-level of bilateral and multilateral cooperation 
channels for its HRD activities. In this sense INSA’s HRD activities have been performed in a 
globally cooperative way for the common international goal of peace and security. The majority 
of the trainees involved with INSA’s international HRD activities are from nuclear newcomer 
countries. 
 
As international societies become ever more interdependent for technological, socio-political, and 
economic reasons, particularly in the aftermath in the Cold War and 9-11, HRD activities have 
become a commonly recognized tool for taking appropriate and universalized measures against 
social, economic, technical and intellectual management. This approach applies even to the 
management of crisis and security threats [4].2 
 
While the nuclear share in the total electricity production in 2013 in the ROK was 27.6 percent, 
the ROK imports approximately 96 percent of its natural energy resources—primarily oil, gas, 
and coal—from abroad. This means that the ROK is seriously dependent on foreign markets to 
assure its natural energy resources [5]. Yet, as a member of the club of nuclear reactor–supplying 
countries since 2009, the ROK is assuming an increased role in strengthening the international 
nuclear nonproliferation and security regime, and is giving emphasis to the importance of HRD 
programs domestically and for newcomer countries. 
 
A center of excellence aims to develop human resources and also provide technical and scientific 
support to ensure the long-term sustainability and effectiveness of nuclear nonproliferation and 
security system in a state. Such a mission also includes spreading awareness and understanding 
on nuclear nonproliferation and security to people who are indirectly related to the nuclear 
industry. The aims of a state-focused COE of nuclear nonproliferation and security can be 
extended to a regional and international scope. In particular, many leading think-tanks and COEs 
have been trying to seek solutions for how to continue to strengthen nuclear security after the 
2016 NSS, where COEs could play a leading role in implementing a nuclear nonproliferation and 
security culture.3 
 
To share lessons learned is to share knowledge and wisdom. Sharing knowledge and wisdom in 
the form of best practices can result in security and prosperity in a society, which can be spread 
                                                     
2
 See, Guy B. Roberts, NATO Centers of Excellence: A Model of Excellence, Paper Presented by the Former NATO 
Officer in the workshop at the Vienna Center for Disarmament and Non-Proliferation (VCDNP) with technical and 
policy experts on nuclear security to explore the potential for collaboration among the existing and planned COE for 
nuclear security in Asia, co-hosted by the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) and the Stanley 
Foundation on October 8, 2014. 
3
 The CSIS and The Stanley Foundation organized a series of workshops to exchange ideas in an off-the-record setting 
among government and other experts on the potential for collaboration among COEs in Asia in technical and policy 
areas on July 17-18, 2014, at the CSIS in Washington, DC, which was followed by the workshop at VCDNP, in Vienna 
on Oct. 8, 2014. Recently, the Ministry of Foreign affairs and International Cooperation and Italian National Agency 
for New Technology, Energy and the Environment in cooperation with the European Commission (EC) and the IAEA 
organized a high-level workshop, entitled “The NSS 2016 and Beyond: the Role of Training and Support Centers, and 
COE,” on May 7-8, 2015, at Bologna, Italy. KINAC will hold a workshop entitled “The Role of the COE and Its Future 
Direction in Preparation of the Post-NSS” at Daejeon, ROK, on August 26-28, 2015. 
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 on a regional and international scale. Sharing lessons learned and wisdom is the main goal of 
INSA, which aims to strengthen national, regional and global peace and security. 
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